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1 INTRODUCTION 
The participation of married women in the labor force in The Netherlands has 
increased very rapidly over the last few decades. In 1962 the number of married 
women with sources of own income was scarcely 18 percent of the total number 
of married women. By 1981 this figure had grown to over 40 percent. As a 
result, the wives' proportion of family income has risen. In 1962 the wives' 
proportion of family income was barely 4 percent, whereas this figure had in- 
creased to more than 12 percent by 1981.1 
Although wives' participation in the labor force in The Netherlands lags 
behind the situation in neighboring countries, the situation described above 
does raise the question of how this development affects the distribution of 
family income and especially its inequality. The reason for this is that labor 
force participation and the wife's proportion of family income (excluding 
childrens' income) vary greatly from one income group to the other. The same 
is true of the development of wives' incomes. In the literature one cannot find 
an unequivocal answer to the above question. Both empirical and theoretical 
investigations give different answers. 2 This uncertainty is closely linked to the 
fact that, especially in the sixties, there was an inverse relationship between the 
wife's decision to start working and the number of hours she wished to work 
* The author is affiliated with the Department of Sociology, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, 
5000 LE Tilburg, and the Department of Economics, Erasmus University Rotterdam, P.O. Box 
1738, 3000 DR Rotterdam, The Netherlands. The research was carried out in the framework of the 
project entitled 'Problems relating to the distribution of social security.' The author wishes to 
thank Professor A. Kapteyn and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this paper. 
1 These percentages are based on pre-tax income; see Grubben (1986b), p. 18, text-table 6. 
2 See for example Betson and Van der Gaag (1984), Bergmann, Radlinski Devine, Gordon, 
Reedy, Sage and Wise (1980), Danziger (1980) and Thurow (1975). More specific for The 
Netherlands are Odink and Pott-Buter (1982), De Kam, Pommer and Wiebrens (1982) and Grub- 
ben (1986b). 
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(and hence the income) on the one hand and the husband's income on the other 
hand. This relationship has subsequently weakened. The last few decades, 
however, theory has reached the conclusion that the observed equalizing effect 
of wives' income on the distribution of family income should diminish. 
Using data for The Netherlands for the years 1962, 1967, 1970, 1975 and 
1981,3 we will try to ascertain how the income inequality of married couples is 
affected by the wives' income. 
We will not go into the problems connected with measuring and comparing 
incomes over time. For the specific Dutch situation we can refer to De Kleijn 
and Van de Stadt (1985) and Grubben (1986a and 1986b). Here we only men- 
tion that we have used the pre-tax income for the years 1962 and 1967, the 
disposable income for the years 1975 and 1981 and both income concepts for 
the year 1970. In all cases the income of married couples (i. e. the wife's and the 
husband's income taken together) is the income unit, and therefore the basis 
for the classification i to deciles. Theoretically we would prefer standardized 
incomes. However, we do not know the distribution of the households by in- 
come and number of children. Also the income of children or other household 
members had to be ignored, because we do not possess the necessary data, 
We start with a theoretical discussion (Section 2). In Section 3 we present a
number of macro characteristics of married couples in The Netherlands with 
reference to income and labor force participation by the wives. The Sections 4 
and 5 contain our empirical analysis. In the last Section our findings are sum- 
marized. 
2 THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Economic theory has had little to say specifically about the effect of wives' 
incomes on the distribution of family earnings. True, in modern microeco- 
nomic labor supply theory the wife's participation in the labor market is 
analysed jointly with other family decision variables and is thus also deter- 
mined by, for example, the husband's (shadow) wage rate (see e.g. Kapteyn 
and Woittiez, 1988); the effect on the ultimate distribution of family income, 
however, has hardly been investigated. The resulting complexity in aggregating 
individual family incomes to derive the relevant distribution could be one of the 
reasons for this. So, Gronau concludes that the concerning effect '... depends 
on the inequality of women's earnings as compared with other sources of in- 
come, on the correlation between the two, and on the wife's share in total 
family income. These in turn depend on participation patterns, the supply of 
labor, and sex-related wage differentials' and his analysis '... indicates that it 
is usually not possible to pinpoint a single factor as the crucial variable' 
3 See Netherlands Central Bureau of Statistics (Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) (1967a; 
1967b; 1972a; 1972b; 1977; 1979; 1980; 1982 and 1985) and Grubben (1985; 1986a nd 1986b). 
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(Gronau, 1982:119). We therefore have to limit ourselves to common-sense 
theoretical considerations. 
It is generally assumed that wives' incomes equalize the distribution of 
family income. According to this view the wife's participation in the labor 
market compensates for changes in the earnings of other family members 
(especially the husband) in order to maintain aggregate family income (see e.g. 
Smith, 1979). Consequently, it is assumed that the wife's labor force partici- 
pation is negatively related to the husband's income. This is especially true for 
the years up to about 1970. In the last ten to fifteen years this relationship has 
weakened, due to the women's movement and efforts to equalize opportunities 
(Danziger, 1980: 444). 
Before that time married women were supposed more likely to work if their 
husband's earned income (and the income of other household members, if any) 
was relatively low. Thus, Smith notes that 'wives of more educated men con- 
centrate their market activities during years when the husbands' comparative 
advantage in market activities is low' (Smith, 1979: S180). This means that 
working wives were predominantly ocated in families at the bottom of the 
income distribution. And this means that the wives' earnings have an 
inequality-reducing impact (Danziger, 1980:444 and Thurow, 1976:5 and 
1980: 156). 
It would also appear to be a common-sense view to state that, as a conse- 
quence of their relatively low labor force participation in the past, women's 
liberation results in a relatively rapid growth in labor force participation for 
wives of high-income husbands, so that income inequality should increase 
relatively (Danziger, 1980:444 and Thurow, 1980: 161). This increase in 
income inequality is strengthened by the fact that mating is a selective process. 
Another argument is that income inequality amongst women is less unequal 
than amongst men. All other factors being equal, this means that an increasing 
labor force participation by wives would reduce inequalities in family incomes. 
Why wives' incomes are more equally distributed than those of husbands is 
not completely clear. To some extent it is a consequence of the underrepresen- 
tation of potential high-income arners in the female labor force. But another 
important cause could be discrimination against females (see Thurow, 1976 
and 1980). On the one hand there is wage discrimination. This affects potential 
high-income earners more than low-income earners. This last group is 
'protected' in most developed countries by the existence of a minimum wage 
system. On the other hand, the wife's career is more frequently interrupted 
than the husband's (for example, child care is mostly the wife's task). Em- 
pirical findings (see e.g. Schm~ihl, 1983: 17a-17c) show that breaks in employ- 
ment have a negative ffect on income and that the resulting lost ground is not 
usually recovered. This is also particularly true for higher incomes. This 
means, however, that 'in a nondiscriminating, equal participation world, 
female earnings are apt to be as unequal as those of men' (Thurow, 1980: 161). 
The net result would be a more unequal distribution of household income. 
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Recapitulating the above, we get: 
1) Women's emancipation leads to a relatively larger labor force partici- 
pation by wives of high-income-earning husbands. This means, under the 
assumption that the labor demand for higher educated females is large 
enough, a growing income inequality; 
2) The struggle to achieve anondiscriminating, equal participation world will 
lead to a situation in which wives' income inequality does not differ from 
that of men. 
It is not unreasonable to assume that this process has been at work in The 
Netherlands since the mid-sixties. Because it will take some time before enough 
women with a high level of education become available for the labor market, 
it is rational to assume that the process has been affecting income inequality in 
the described way since about 1970. We may also assume that, apart from 
factors in the field of discrimination and emancipation, the factors influencing 
income inequality among men are at work in the same way for income inequal- 
ity among women. Examples of this are institutional factors, such as rates of 
taxation, social security schemes and so on. 
The impact of wives' income on family income inequality will be further 
examined in Section 4. First, we go into the developments in the field of wives' 
labor force participation and income inequality. 
3 SOME GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Table 1 contains a number of general characteristics of the population under 
consideration for the period 1962-1981. Row 1 gives the number of married 
couples with at least one income. Row 2 shows the number of married women 
with their own income. This includes both wives working outside the home, 
and those on their husband's payroll. The number of married couples increased 
from 2.8 million in 1962 to 3.3 million in 1981. The number of wives with a 
separate income rose even faster: from almost 500,000 in 1962 to more than 
1.3 million in 1981. This means that the ratio of the number of wives with a 
separate income to the number of married couples with at least one income has 
grown. This ratio can roughly be interpreted as being the participation rate of 
married women in the employed labor force. This rate can be found in row 3. 
We see that the rate has more than doubled: in 1962 it was 17.8 percent and in 
1981 40.1 percent. 
The next part of Table 1 provides information about income. The mean 
income (not adjusted for inflation) of married couples rose from Dfl. 8,800 in 
1962 to Dfl. 17,700 in 1970 (pre-tax income) and from Dfl. 15,200 in 1970 to 
Dfl. 35,000 in 1981 (disposable income). Looking at the period as a whole, we 
can conclude that the mean income of households with one income increased 
somewhat less than that of households in which both husband and wife had an 
income. The transition from pre-tax to disposable income does not affect the 
proportions between couples with one and two partners with an income. In 
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both cases the disposable income amounts to 86 percent of the pre-tax income. 
Row 7 gives the mean income of the working wife: it increased from Dfl. 2,000 
in 1962 to Dfl. 3,700 in 1970 (pre-tax income) and from Dfl. 3,100 in 1970 to 
Dfl. 9,900 in 1981 (disposable income). The proportional change as a conse- 
quence of the change-over f om pre-tax to disposable income in 1970 (85 per- 
cent) nearly equals the change in couples' income. So, the transition hardly 
influences mean income developments. The rise in the mean income of working 
wives is substantially arger than the growth in the mean income of couples. In 
other words, the wife's share of the combined income of husband and wife has 
increased. The wife's income as a percentage of the income of households with 
two incomes grew from 19.4 to 24.1 percent (row 10), whereas the figures for 
the proportion with respect o the total population were 4.0 and 11.2 percent 
respectively (row 11). The income received by households with respectively two 
incomes and one income as a percentage of the income of all couples together 
is given in rows 8 and 9. In view of the above it will come as no surprise that the 
proportion of households with two incomes has grown and that this develop- 
ment has been at the expense of households with one income. 
The next part of Table 1 gives us information on income inequality by means 
of the Theil coefficient. The Theil coefficients are calculated on the basis of the 
division into deciles. We see that the Theil coefficient decreases in all cases 
during the period 1962-1981. But the decline is not equal for all categories. The 
biggest decrease (corrected for the conversion from pre-tax income to 
disposable income) is in the households with two earning partners. Here we 
note a reduction in the Theil coefficient of about 51 percent. The smallest 
decline is found in the households with one earning partner (which is usually 
the husband). Here the decrease is scarcely 5 percent. The drop for all house- 
holds together was 22 percent, as compared with 47 percent in the husband's 
income in households with two incomes. The increase between 1962 and 1967 
and the rise in the income inequality of households with one earning partner 
between 1975 and 1981 are the most striking features. 
One notable point is that the Theil coefficient of married men whose wives 
work (row 15) is larger than that of married men whose wives do not work 
between 1962 and 1970 (row 13). But the difference gets smaller in the course 
of time and after 1970 the roles are reversed. 
The change-over f om pre-tax to disposable income in 1970 affects the Theil 
coefficient for the households with both partners receiving an income heavier 
than those households with one income. The reduction in income inequality as 
measured by the Theil coefficient amounts to 44 and 27 percent respectively. It 
appears that taxes levy wives' income share stronger than husbands' one, which 
is in accordance with the Dutch tax structure at that time. The change in income 
concept does not change the proportions between the Theil coefficients for 
husbands with a partner receiving an income and husbands with a partner 
receiving no income. So, the reduction in income inequality for households 
with two incomes, in comparison with households having only one income, can 
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completely be ascribed to the changes (due to the transition from pre-tax to 
disposable income) in the wives' effect on income inequality. 
4 THE WIVES' CONTRIBUTION TOWARDS THE INCOME INEQUALITY OF MARRIED 
COUPLES 
We have chosen the Theil coefficient as the measure of inequality. This was 
done because this inequality measure is easily decomposed. Also, the possibil- 
ities for interpretation are maintained after the Theil coefficient has been 
decomposed. We use these properties to determine the wives' contribution 
towards the income inequality of married couples for the years chosen. 4The 
definition of the Theil coefficient (T) is: 
k 
T= ~ yi* ln(Y i /n i )  (1) 
i=1 
in which k is the number of income groups distinguished, Yi is the proportion 
of income group i in the total income and n i is the number of income earners 
in income group i as a proportion of the total number of income earners. We 
now divide the population of married couples into two separate groups: 
households in which only the husband receives an income and households in 
which both husband and wife receive an income. We define Y1 as the income 
of married couples and Y2 as the income of married couples minus the wife's 
income (in other words: the husband's income). The Theil coefficients corre- 
sponding to these income concepts are designated T1 and T2 respectively. 
Decomposition of the Theil coefficient of Y1 gives: 
T1 = B1 + o 1 • T1  w + (1 - O l ) .  Zlnw (2) 
in which B1 is the Theil measure of the between-group inequality pertaining to 
the Y1 income concept, v 1 is the income of couples with two incomes as a pro- 
portion of the total income of married couples and T1 w and Tlnw are the Theil 
coefficients of households with two incomes and one income respectively. 
A similar approach is used to obtain the Theil coefficient T2 applying to the 
Y2 income concept: 
7"2 = B2 + 02 . T2w + (1 - 02). T2nw (3) 
The effect of the wife's income on the income inequality of married couples is 
given by: 
I = T2 - 7"I (4) 
4 See also for example Betson and Van der Gaag (1984), pp. 534-535. 
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Since o i = It. z i (i = 1,2), in which It is the participation rate of married women 
in the employed labor force and ri is the mean income of households with two 
incomes as a proportion of the mean income of all couples together and 
because Tlnw = T2nw, we have: 
I = (B2-B1)  +it .  (r 2 • T2 w-  r 1 • Tlw) + Tlnw" It" (Zl - rz) 
=Q+it 'R+ T lnw' i t 'S  
= Q+RI+S1 (5) 
Here Q = B2-B I  is the change in income inequality between the two groups 
(i.e. between households with one and two incomes respectively) due to wives' 
income;/1 is the participation rate of married women in the employed labor 
force; R1 =it.  R =/1- (r2' T2w-  rl "Tlw) is the change in the income inequality 
of households with two incomes as a proportion of the total income inequality 
of married couples due to wives' income; and $1= Tlnw.it" (Zl-  z2) is the 
change in the income inequality of households with one income as a proportion 
of the total income inequality of married couples due to the income in 
households with two incomes. There are thus two effects applying to the 
households with two incomes: the change in the Theil coefficient i self (T1 w as 
compared to T2,~) and the change in the weight of their contribution towards 
total income inequality (o 1 as compared to o2, and hence "q as compared to r2). 
Households with one income are also affected, since the weight of their con- 
tribution towards total income inequality is also determined by their income 
share and this in turn is dependent on wives' income in households with two 
incomes. This effect is determined by (1 -  Ol) and (1 -  o2) respectively and 
hence by z 1 as compared to r2. 
The results can be found in Table 2. Row 8 gives the total effect of working 
wives on the income inequality of married couples. Factor I always has a 
positive sign, which means that working wives have an equalizing effect on the 
income distribution of married couples. At the beginning of the period con- 
sidered the effect is rather limited, but gradually it increases. In 1962 working 
wives' income decreases income inequality by about 1.4 percent. By 1967 this 
figure had risen to 2.5 percent and in 1970 it was 3.2. percent (pre-tax income). 
The effect of working wives' income on disposable income is larger than on 
pre-tax income. Switching from pre-tax income to disposable income almost 
triples the effect: it rises from 3.2 to 8.9 percent. This triplication of the 
equalizing effect has been caused by four elements. Firstly, the negative ffect 
of Q has somewhat diminished (from -0.0036 to -0.0031). Secondly R, the 
change (due to wives' income) in the income inequality of households with two 
incomes, rises from 0.0052 to 0.0343. This is in accordance with the changes in 
the Theil coefficient (due to the change in the income concept) of households 
with both partners having an income (see Table 1). Thirdly, the r/'s change, 
but their changes are minor. Lastly Tlnw (see Table 1, line 13) decreases, which 
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influences the change in I in a negative way. While the tax structure hardly 
changed in the period 1962-1970 and the premiums of the social security 
settlements - introduced uring that period - were compensated for, switching 
from pre-tax income to disposable income will also lead to approximately a 
triplication of the equalizing effect - as measured by I / T2  - in the years 1962 
and 1967. 
Between 1970 and 1975 the equalizing effect decreased sharply, and then 
between 1975 and 1981 we note a further increase. The level for 1981 is almost 
equal to that of 1970. Up to and including 1970 we see that the growth in the 
participation rate of married women is accompanied by an equalization of the 
income distribution, but the increase between 1967 and 1970 is smaller than 
that between 1962 and 1967. After 1970 the rise in the above participation rate 
is accompanied by a decline in the extent to which working wives' income 
decreases income inequality, but between 1975 and 1981 we once more see a 
growing equalizing influence. Probably, this is stimulated by the shortage of 
low- and unskilled workers in the 1950's and early 1960's in The Netherlands. 
This pressure led to large real wage increases and special rises in the minimum 
wage during a number of years. Besides, the change in the tax system in 1962 
made it more attractive for married women to participate. This change implied 
that wife's earnings were not added anymore to their husband's earnings, but 
were levied separately. As a consequence the mean tax rate for wife's earnings 
considerably declined. The combination of the changes in the tax system and 
the wage increases, especially for lower educated workers, influenced relative 
prices for market and home production, to the benefit of the first one. Since 
about 1967, and especially in the 1970's, the demand for low- and unskilled 
workers, however, declined. Underemployment wi hin this group grew and hit 
female workers relatively harder than male ones. At the end of the 1970's the 
difference between unemployment rates for females and males had almost 
disappeared and unemployment was not only limited to the low- and unskilled 
workers. 
TABLE 2 - THE CONTRIBUTION OF WIVES WITH AN OWN INCOME TOWARDS 
THE INCOME INEQUALITY OF MARRIED COUPLES 
1962 1967 1970 1970 1975 1981 
pre-tax disp. 
1. Q - 0.0027 - 0.0027 - 0.0036 - 0.0031 - 0.0067 - 0.0081 
2. p 0.1782 0.2199 0.2844 0.2844 0.3010 0.4010 
3. R - 0.0045 0.0016 0.0052 0 .0343 0.0126 0.0226 
4. R1 - 0.0008 0.0004 0.0015 0.0098 0.0038 0.0091 
5. Tl,w 0.1764 0.2196 0.1972 0.1426 0.1110 0.1213 
6_ S 0.1942 0.1637 0.1495 0.1488 0.1505 0.1666 
7. S1 0.0061 0.0079 0.0084 0.0060 0.0050 0.0081 
8. I 0.0026 0.0055 0 .0063 0.0127 0 .0021 0.0090 
9. I /T2 
(07o) 1.4 2.5 3.2 8.9 2.0 8.7 
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The inequality measures of households with one income and two incomes 
respectively seemed to be converging, but since 1975 a diverging tendency has 
been discernible. The development of this difference is expressed by the factors 
Q and R. The between-group inequality (Q) shows the expected picture: as a 
consequence of the participation of the working wife in the process of income 
formation, income inequality between households with one income and house- 
holds with two incomes gets wider. This is caused particularly by the fact that 
this process further reduces the income inequality between households with 
two incomes and thus increases the gap between these households and those 
with one income (for which the income inequality is larger). Developments in 
the relative share held by the group of households with two incomes (z) are 
negligible. 
The factor R1 shows a contrasting picture. In 1962 the income of working 
wives led, via the share held by households with two incomes, to greater income 
inequality between married couples in terms of total income. After that year we 
note an equalizing effect. However, between 1970 and 1975 the degree of 
equalization becomes temporarily smaller. 
The effect of wives with sources of income on the share held by households 
with one income in income inequality ($1) is an equalizing one: as a conse- 
quence of the wives' income the income of households with two incomes as a 
proportion of total income has risen at the expense of the income of households 
with one income. Therefore the larger income inequality of the latter group 
counts for less in the total income inequality of married couples. Developments 
in $1 are, however, unpredictable (as a consequence of the developments in 
Tlnw and S), but the changes are rather minor. 
Summarizing we can say that the income of earning wives has an income 
equalizing effect. But the extent o which it equalizes income is not constant 
during the period under investigation. Between 1962 and 1970 we observe a 
growing equalizing effect, between 1970 and 1975 a declining equalizing effect, 
whereas the effect increases again between 1975 and 1981. As is to be expected, 
it is mainly the income inequality of the group of households with two incomes 
which is the major factor. The effect exerted through between-group inequal- 
ity, however, must not be neglected. Although it is true that the effect due to 
the income inequality of households with one income is large (in absolute 
terms), this effect is relatively less important in explaining the observed 
changes, because of its stable character. 
We must also note that the above is only true if we assume that there are no 
consequences when the wife stops working and earning money. If there are 
consequences, however, then the equalizing effect will be larger, given the 
development in the Theil coefficients. For example, it is quite conceivable that 
in that case the income distribution of men whose wives are currently earning 
an income would shift towards the distribution of men whose wives have no 
income. There would then still be an equalizing effect (see rows 12 and 13 in 
Table 1); indeed, the effect would actually be greater! In the extreme situation, 
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 57 
where the income distribution of married couples with two incomes shifted 
towards that of households with one income, the equalizing effect in 1962 
would hardly change, in 1967 it would be 0.2 percent more, in 1970 0.3 (pre-tax 
income) and 0.9 percent (disposable income), in 1975 0.9 and in 1981 as much 
as 2.6 percent. 
5 A FURTHER ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGES IN THE PERIOD 1962-1981 
The Theil coefficient's property of being decomposable enables us to analyse 
developments in the course of time more extensively. For this purpose we 
rewrite 5equation (2) to obtain (6): 
T =/2 .  r w . ln ( rw)  + (1 - /2 .  rw)-/n((1 -/2- rw)/(1 -/2)) + 
/2.z- w • Tw+(1 - /2.  rw)-T,w (6) 
Just as we defined the mean income of households with two incomes as a 
proportion of the income of all married couples together, we can define 
(1 -/2- rw)/(1 -/2) as the mean income of households with one income as a 
proportion of the mean income of all married couples together. We thus 
designate this factor by rnw. The first two components on the right-hand side 
of equation (6) account for the between-group inequality, whereas the latter 
two indicate the effect of the within-group inequality. Applying the difference 
operator to equation (6) and in each case taking the mean over the two years 
(the base and final period values respectively) for the aggregation weights, we 
then get: 
T = T(tl) - T( to )  
= zx(U.rw. Tw + (1 -U"  rw)' T.w)+ 
a(U- r~./n(rw) + (1 -/2. r~)./n(r.w)) 
=/u .  r w . A Tw + (1 - /2- r w ) . A Tn w 
+ T w • z~(/2, rw)+ Tm~. A(1 - /2.  rw) 
+ ln ( rw) .  A ( /2 .  rw)+ l n ( r ,w)"  ~(1 --/2-rw) 
+/2 . r  w • A ln ( rw)+ (1 -/2-rw)-Aln(rnw) 
I 
II 
III 
IV (7) 
Part Io f  equation (7) can be interpreted as the impact of changes in the within- 
group inequality; parts lI and III indicate the effect of changes in the popula- 
tion proportions on the within-group and between-group components, respec- 
5 See Mookherjee and Shorrocks (1982). For the sake of simplicity we have ignored the index 1 
(indicating that we use the income concept Y1, the income of married couples, including the wives' 
income). 
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tively; and part IV can be interpreted as the effect of changes in the relative 
income of the subpopulat ions distinguished and hence as the effect of the 
changes in the elements of between-group inequality. Thus, parts I and IV give 
the impact of the changes in the elements which form the Theil coefficient, 
whereas parts II and II I  represent the effect of the changes in the weights of the 
elements. 
The contr ibut ion of each of the factors to the total change in the inequality 
measure is given in Table 3. It is clear from this table that the changes in the 
Theil coefficient are mainly determined by the changes in within-group in- 
equality (part I). The effect of the income shares of the subpopulat ions due to 
within-group inequality (part II) is somewhat less marked. On the other hand, 
the effect of the income shares due to the between-group component  (part III) 
is large, though this is completely compensated for (when we consider the 
period as a whole) by the changes in the elements which determine between- 
group inequality (part IV). 
Looking at the effect of the within-group component,  we see that the propor- 
t ion of households with one income is larger than that of households with two 
incomes up to and including 1975. After that year the reverse applies. The 
afore-mentioned increase in income inequality in the group of households with 
one income between 1975 and 1981 also emerges. The relative proport ion of 
households with one income contr ibut ing towards the total (equalizing) effect 
TABLE 3 - THE DECOMPOSITION OF THE CHANGES IN INCOME INEQUALITY 
INTO FOUR PARTS 
receiving 
an income 
Year 1967 1970 1975 1981 1981 
to to to to to 
1962 1967 1970 1975 1962 
both partners 0.004 - 0.005 - 0.009 - 0.009 - 0.019 
one partner 0.033 - 0.016 - 0.021 0.006 0.002 
total 0.038 - 0.021 - 0.030 - 0.003 - 0.017 
II both partners 0.008 0.013 0.003 0.006 0.030 
one partner - 0.009 - 0.015 - 0.004 - 0.013 - 0.041 
total - 0.001 - 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.007 - 0.012 
III both partners 0.006 0.009 0.005 0.017 0.037 
one partner 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.010 0.017 
total 0.008 0.013 0.007 0.027 0.055 
IV both partners - 0.005 - 0.002 0.016 - 0.009 0.000 
one partner - 0.003 - 0.011 - 0.019 - 0.017 - 0.050 
total - 0.008 - 0.012 - 0.003 - 0.026 - 0.049 
AT 0.037 -- 0.023 - 0.028 -- 0.008 -- 0.022 
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therefore decreases. This is a consequence of, among other things, the change 
in these households' income as a proportion of the total income of married 
couples. This is chiefly caused by the increased labor force participation of 
married women and is less dependent on the mean income of households with 
one income as a percentage of that of households with two incomes. 
The overall effect of the changes in the income share due to the within-group 
component is small, but its components (households with one and two incomes) 
may have high values. While the (absolute) changes in the income share of the 
two groups are equal (and differ only in sign) and the differences in the Theil 
coefficients of both groups are relatively small, the net effect is small. It is 
slightly negative, which means that the changes in the income shares have a 
small equalizing effect due to the within-group components in the period 
1962-1981. This stands to reason because there is a 'transfer' from the income 
share of households with one income to that of households with two incomes 
and the income inequality for the latter group is less than for the former. 
For the effect of the income shares due to the between-group components, 
the changes in the income shares are the same for both groups (apart from the 
sign), but the income factors that determine the between-group inequality 
[ln(rw) and ln(rnw)] differ heavily. The net effect is positive, which means that 
the change in the income shares has strongly increased income inequality. This 
is caused by the fact that there is a transfer in the income shares in favour of 
the group that makes the largest contribution to the between-group inequality, 
viz. the households with two incomes. 
Finally, we come to the changes in the relative income of the subpopulations 
distinguished. These form the basis of the size of the between-group inequality. 
Because they have converged there is a very strong equalizing impact from this 
element. 
When comparing the results, we must take into account the change-over 
from pre-tax income to disposable income in 1970. The total effect of the 
change-over approximately results in a decline of T by 0.060. This decrease 
mainly results from changes in part I of equation (7). Consequently, the effect 
between 1967 and 1970 equals the effect between 1970 and 1975, and speaking 
in terms of disposable income, the size of AT will probably amount o about 
0.030 between 1962 and 1967. 
If  we combine the results from Table 3 with those from the last section then 
it is possible to determine the extent o which the change in income inequality 
of wives with an income deviates from that of all married couples. For this pur- 
pose Table 4 gives the change in the Theil coefficient for married couples (AT, 
or, strictly speaking, A T1 in terms of the last section) and the change in the 
Theil coefficient for husbands (i. e. with the wives' income excluded, A T2). The 
difference between these two values can be interpreted as the extent o which 
changes in wives' income have influenced the equalizing effect of this income 
on the distribution of the income of married couples. When the difference is 
positive the equalizing effect of wives' income has grown and when it is 
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negative the influence is less equalizing than before. As we saw in the preceding 
section, the wives with earnings generally have a growing equalizing effect on 
the income distribution. However, between 1970 and 1975 we see that the 
equalization of income was slowing down. As a result, the extent to which 
wives' income equalizes family income inequality is only slightly more in 1981 
than in 1962. 
6 RI~SUMI~ 
In this article we have looked at the importance of wives' incomes for the 
income distribution of married couples. 6The analysis hows that their income 
has an equalizing effect. The extent to which this applies, however, differs 
from period to period. Between 1970 and 1975 we note a particular stagnation. 
During this period it even had a negative ffect on developments in the income 
inequality of married couples. Bearing in mind behavioural reactions that 
might result when the wife no longer has an income, then the equalizing effect 
is underestimated. 
The other side of the coin is that the income inequality for men with an 
earning wife is much lower than that for men whose wives do not have any 
income. The difference between these two groups is growing during the whole 
period. 
From the point of view of policy this is an important conclusion. In the 
discussion of income equalizing trends in The Netherlands (and also other 
countries), the effect of the increased labor force participation of married 
women is ignored. It is reasonable to ask whether this is justified. This element 
of income equalization is a consequence of a desirable policy (among other 
things from the point of view of emancipation) and not directly (though 
possibly indirectly) a consequence of changes in the primary and secondary 
income distribution of individuals. This supports the need for a correction for 
TABLE 4 - THE EFFECT OF CHANGES IN THE INCOME DISTRIBUTION OF WIVES 
WITH AN INCOME ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE INCOME INEQUALITY OF 
MARRIED COUPLES 
Year 1967 1970 1975 1981 1981 
to to to to to 
1962 1967 1970 1975 1962 
AT2 0.040 - 0.022 - 0.039 - 0.001 - 0.022 
AT 0.037 - 0.023 - 0.028 -- 0.008 - 0.022 
AT2-AT 0.003 0.001 - 0.011 0.007 0.001 
6 The picture hardly changes when we include cohabitation in the analysis; ee Grubben (1986b), 
p. 22. 
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th is  e f fect  when cons ider ing  the  deve lopments  in income inequa l i ty  (and  
prec ise ly  w i th  re ference  to  the  des i red  income equa l i za t ion  or  poss ib ly  des i red 
increase  in income inequa l i ty ) ]  In  that  case the  (cor rected)  income equa l i za -  
t ion  for  the  last  few decades  wou ld  be  cons iderab ly  less then  is assumed 
nowadays .  
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Summary  
THE EFFECT OF INCREASED LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF MARRIED 
WOMEN ON THE DISTRIBUTION OF FAMILY INCOME IN THE NETHERLANDS 
In this article we analyse the income qualizing effect of wives' income on the combined income 
of husband and wife in The Netherlands. We will use the Theil coefficient as a measure of inequali- 
ty. After some preliminary remarks have been made and relevant data have been presented, the 
Theil coefficient isdecomposed into a number of components. Whereas theory concludes that the 
effect of wives' income on the distribution of family income should be less equalizing after about 
1970, it appears that this does not hold true for the whole period under investigation. 
